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LIBRA: A CONCENTRATE OF “BLOCKCHAIN 
ANTITRUST” 
Dr. Thibault Schrepel* 
Blockchains promise to decentralize the economy, bypassing trusts in 
favor of decentralized communities. The World Economic Forum predicts 
that 10 percent of the global gross domestic product will be stored on block-
chain by 2027.1 Gartner further prophesizes that blockchain will create $3.1 
trillion worth of business value by 2030.2 Even if that prediction turns out to 
be too optimistic, blockchain’s legal implications cannot be neglected. 
But what are blockchains? Although blockchains each have their own 
unique characteristics, they also share similar mechanisms that allow for 
broad analysis. Blockchains are, first and foremost, distributed and decen-
tralized ledgers that can record manually or automatically all sorts of trans-
actions between users (this is the “platform layer”).3 Put differently, they are 
databases with singular features. Blockchains may in fact be public, where 
anyone can see the information it contains, or private, where one or several 
users control access to the blockchain.4 They may also be permissionless—
where anyone can write on the blockchain—or permissioned—where only 
specific users can write on it.5 
Most blockchains, such as the Ethereum, are designed so that applica-
tions can function on top of the database.6 These applications (the “software 
layer”) are commonly sorted into three categories: cryptocurrencies, smart 
contracts, and others.7 Mark Zuckerberg introduced Libra to the world in 
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June 2019 with the goal of “enabl[ing] a simple global currency and financial 
infrastructure that empowers billions of people.”8 As such, Libra falls into 
the first category: cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency in general, but Libra in 
particular, has drawn regulators’ attention. Two months after Zuckerberg’s 
announcement, and without waiting for the project to be launched, the Eu-
ropean Commission sent a questionnaire to various parties connected to Li-
bra in order to investigate “potential anti-competitive behavior.”9 The U.S. 
House of Representatives also conducted a series of hearings at the end of 
October 2019 questioning the intentions behind Libra.10 But the battle be-
tween political and technological elites was just getting started. Numerous 
regulators have since then expressed their skepticism regarding the project, 
which, some say, is already nipped in the bud.11 
This article aims to analyze the pro- and anticompetitive risks of the Li-
bra project to address the overall desirability of the European Commission 
and the House of Representatives’ adversarial approaches. 
On the one hand, blockchain creates numerous issues for antitrust law 
that can be designated under the label “blockchain antitrust.”12 As it turns 
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book’s Libra White Paper Is Now Live, FORBES (June 18, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites
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Failed,” INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.ibtimes.com/switzerland-president-
slams-facebooks-libra-project-has-failed-2894855 [https://perma.cc/5M3Y-7FND]. For a more 
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 12. See generally Schrepel, supra note 3 (exploring the “blockchain antitrust” paradox by 
unpacking the unique questions blockchain poses to anticompetitive identification and regula-
tion). Generally speaking, the following analyses are solely based on public information regard-
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out, Libra is an excellent catalyst for exposing the anticompetitive issues that 
may appear in permissioned blockchain. On the other hand, regulatory in-
tervention at the stage of product design carries significant risks of creating 
Type I errors.13 Plus, Libra’s objective to disrupt the existing financial system 
cannot be ignored. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult. With this 
in mind, Part I of this Essay analyzes the type of governance that Libra is 
aiming for, as this indicates the nature and frequency of certain anticompeti-
tive risks. Part II then offers an assessment of the anticompetitive collusion 
and monopolization that Libra governance might yield. The discussion con-
cludes by assessing the desirability of the adversarial approach adopted by 
national and international antitrust agencies thus far. 
I. LIBRA’S GOVERNANCE: A DETERMINANT FOR COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 
The Libra Association’s governance features the essential characteristics 
of a permissioned blockchain14 in which only select users will take turns val-
idating the transactions submitted into the network: 
The association is governed by the Libra Association Council, which is 
comprised of one representative per validator node. Together, they make 
decisions on the governance of the network and reserve. . . . An important 
objective of the Libra Association is to move toward increasing decentrali-
zation over time. . . . [T]he association will develop a path toward permis-
sionless governance and consensus on the Libra network. The association’s 
objective will be to start this transition within five years . . . .15 
For the Libra blockchain to become permissionless,16 the Libra Associa-
tion will wait for the development of a “proven solution that can deliver the 
 
[https://perma.cc/GRN8-YLAL]. As such, analyses in this Essay do not purport to be definitive 
in any way. They are, rather, a first approach to the subject. The European Commission or U.S. 
authorities may very well open investigations on different grounds based on the information 
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 13. Thibault Schrepel, Predatory Innovation: The Definite Need for Legal Recognition, 21 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 19, 35 & n.92 (2018). In this case, the risk is of condemnation (or 
restriction by regulation) of a service that would benefit consumers. 
 14. For a definition of what permissioned blockchain is, see Schrepel, supra note 6, at 4. 
It should be noted, moreover, that Libra is quite a narrow permissioned blockchain. As 
stressed by Consensys, “[t]he Libra consortium is only as decentralized as the number of vali-
dator nodes in the network, which today is made up of 29 of some of the world’s largest enter-
prises and financial institutions, which only seems to further centralize power.” Coogan 
Brennan, Libra Guide: Understanding Facebook’s Digital Currency, CONSENSYS 19 (Sept. 11, 
2019), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4795067/Cons-Guide-Libra-03.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/YQD3-XART]. 
 15. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 16. Libra has disclosed its intention to then use a proof-of-stake system “where valida-
tors are assigned voting rights proportional to the number of Libra coins they hold.” See 
AMSDEN, supra note 12, at 24. For a definition of what permissionless blockchain is, see 
SCHREPEL, supra note 6, at 3–4, 3 n.5. Also, if such a transformation takes place, the lack of de-
fined boundaries for this type of blockchains raises questions regarding the ability to conceptu-
alize antitrust law around it. See id. 
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scale, stability, and security needed to support billions of people and transac-
tions across the globe through a permissionless network.”17 In other words, 
the change in governance may never come. One may wonder if such a vague 
strategy is best for Facebook, considering the distrust surrounding the com-
pany. 
As it stands, it is true that permissioned blockchains are not per se anti-
competitive. Their features can benefit consumers, just as closed platforms 
like iOS do.18 However, permissioned blockchain makes it easier to imple-
ment a number of anticompetitive practices, particularly those falling under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).19 Permissioned blockchains feature a pilot 
in the cockpit, that is, a person or group of persons capable of controlling 
access and engaging in anticompetitive behaviors.20 Because permissioned 
blockchains will most likely be subject to close antitrust scrutiny, one may 
question Libra’s strategy not to have waited to build Libra on a permission-
less blockchain. 
Finally, one may find a particular interest—if and when the mutation in-
to permissionless blockchain occurs—in analyzing the extent to which Li-
bra’s blockchain will be fully open. A partial opening would have the effect 
of creating a substantial competitive disadvantage for the companies barred 
from accessing it, which would be predatory innovation.21 
II. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL ANTICOMPETITIVE 
CONDUCTS 
Libra’s governance opens up possibilities for different anticompetitive 
practices in terms of collusion (Section A) and monopolization (Section B). 
Although Libra is still a project, a risk map can nonetheless be sketched. 
A. Libra and the Risk of Collusion 
The Libra Association’s primary mission is to “facilitate the operation of 
the Libra Blockchain . . . [and] coordinate the agreement among its stake-
holders—the network’s validator nodes—in their pursuit to promote, devel-
op, and expand the network, and to manage the reserve.”22 Moreover, during 
the “early years of the network,” the Libra Association will have additional 
missions, namely, the “recruitment of Founding Members to serve as valida-
tor nodes . . . ; the design and implementation of incentive programs to pro-
 
 17. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 4. 
 18. See Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem?, 7 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 91, 96–100 (2011). 
 19. See Schrepel, supra note 3, at 306–08. 
 20. See id. 290–91. 
 21. See Schrepel, supra note 13, at 48 (explaining the concept of predatory innovation 
and showing that the partial opening of a platform can have anticompetitive effects). 
 22. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 8. 
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pel the adoption of Libra, including the distribution of such incentives to 
Founding Members; and the establishment of the association’s social impact 
grant-making program.”23 
First, because Libra is incorporated as an association of undertakings 
and not as a firm, one cannot ignore the risk of collusion its organization 
creates among its members.24 As these members retain their independence, 
the Libra Association’s decisions will establish a cartel between independent 
firms eager to coordinate their market behavior when such practices create a 
negative effect on trade. Thereupon, one may question the nature of the “in-
centive programs to propel the adoption of Libra” mentioned in the Associa-
tion’s white paper.25 Questions also arise regarding the relationships between 
the firms belonging to the Libra Association. Any side agreements between 
them could catch the attention of antitrust agencies. 
Second, the type of protocol consensus used in the Libra blockchain cre-
ates a technical risk of collusion. The type of consensus mechanism Libra us-
es dictates how new information and transactions will be recorded on the 
blockchain.26 While it does not appear that one protocol can be anticompeti-
tive per se, some protocols are more conducive to anticompetitive practices 
than others.27 The collusive risk is particularly high, for instance, when a 
protocol allows a small group of users who control the blockchain’s integrity 
to validate the transactions executed on the blockchain.28 The risk is also 
high when consensus validators are identified by the community and can po-
tentially be corrupted.29 Conversely, when these validators are chosen ran-
domly and their identity is protected, the risk of collusion at the protocol 
level tends to disappear. In this case, the Libra Association has announced a 
protocol that seems particularly conducive to collusion, which can almost be 
found in its wording: “To facilitate agreement among all validator nodes on 
the transactions to be executed and the order in which they are executed, the 
Libra Blockchain adopted the BFT approach by using the LibraBFT consen-
sus protocol. . . . Founding Members [will] serve as validator nodes . . . .” 30 
 
 23. Id. Founding Members currently include tech, nonprofit, and venture capital organ-
izations such as Uber, Iliad, Kiva, Mastercard, Visa, PayPal, and Thrive Capital. See Founding 
Members, LIBRA ASS’N, https://libra.org/en-US/association/#founding_members [https://
perma.cc/ZP94-8K7N]. 
 24. See Schrepel, supra note 6, at 10–15. The fact that the Libra Association is not a firm 
has consequences in terms of corporate liability, making its members accountable only to 
themselves. But this has no direct impact in terms of antitrust liability assignment insofar as it 
applies to any entity regardless of its legal form. 
 25. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 8. 
 26. Thibault Schrepel, Collusion by Blockchain and Smart Contracts, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 117, 122 (2019). 
 27. See id. at 134–40. 
 28. Id. at 138. 
 29. Id. 
 30. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 5, 8 (emphasis added). 
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As such, founding members will be able to coordinate to capture the fees 
generated by the validation of transactions, excluding others from the pro-
cess. Such capture could amount to market sharing. 
B. Libra and the Risk of Monopolization 
On top of the risk of collusion, the Libra project involves a risk of mo-
nopolization. Abuses of market power can only exist when an entity holds 
great market power. For that reason, one should first define the relevant 
market and then compare all the players in that market to assess their indi-
vidual influences. Libra’s market power cannot be quantified as it is not yet 
on the market. Assuming, however, that Libra will succeed in holding great 
market power, its unilateral practices will be closely monitored by regulatory 
authorities across the world. 
First, regulators will be skeptical of the relationship between Libra and 
Calibra. Calibra, a subsidiary of Facebook,31 has two objectives: (1) to guar-
antee the separation of social data (that of Facebook) from financial data 
(that of Libra) and (2) to create and operate services using the Libra net-
work.32 As such, notwithstanding the fact that Facebook is only one member 
among others the Libra Association’s governance, it retains great power over 
Libra by owning the dominant wallet. Calibra will be the only wallet author-
ized to operate within the broader Facebook ecosystem, which includes Mes-
senger and WhatsApp (nothing is said about Instagram).33 Libra will 
function with other wallets too, but not within Facebook’s 2.7 billion user 
ecosystem. 
Two sub-issues of antitrust law arise in this regard. The first relates to 
the risk of tying between Facebook and Calibra. If, for instance, a Calibra ac-
count is automatically created for each Facebook user, antitrust agencies will 
likely intervene. The same goes if Calibra’s customer service, for the time be-
ing announced as a “24/7/365 support in Messenger and WhatsApp,”34 is not 
accessible using the standalone application. 
 
 31. On its website, Calibra indicates that “[t]he Calibra company is a subsidiary of Face-
book, Inc. Calibra operates independently from Facebook.” Frequently Asked Questions, 
CALIBRA, https://www.calibra.com/?locale=EN_en [https://perma.cc/TE5N-V7RQ]. This in-
dependence does not necessarily exist in terms of antitrust law. If Facebook wholly owns Cali-
bra, a capital presumption provides, to the contrary, that the subsidiary is not independent of 
the parent company. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769–71 (1984). 
In such a scenario, there is no possible collusion between the two entities since they form a sin-
gle firm. Id. In return, however, the liability for all anticompetitive practices implemented by 
the subsidiary goes to the parent company. Id. For the equivalent European Union doctrine, 
see Case C-516/15 P, Akzo Nobel NV v. Commission, 2017, http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190169&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=485827 [https://perma.cc/SF7R-YJXD]. 
 32. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 4. 
 33. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 31. Please note that Calibra will also be 
available as a standalone app. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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The second sub-issue relates to the exclusivity Calibra will enjoy in terms 
of access to Facebook’s ecosystem. By denying access to all other digital wal-
lets within its ecosystem, Facebook could create a bottleneck effect. Courts 
and agencies will, however, sanction such a practice only if Facebook is re-
garded as an essential facility, an issue that is likely to be debated at length.35 
Second, another regulatory risk stems from several antitrust authorities’ 
willingness to use antitrust law as a tool for privacy issues.36 As a result of 
overlooking the causal link between dominant market positions and privacy 
abuses, antitrust agencies may regard any harmful practices implemented by 
dominant companies as potential privacy abuses.37 Thus the mechanism by 
which Calibra will obtain users’ consent to share their financial information 
with Facebook will most likely be under scrutiny from a competition-law 
angle. Facebook would indeed have a strong interest in obtaining Calibra’s 
very valuable data. For the time being, it merely states that “Calibra will not 
share customers’ account information or financial data with Facebook unless 
people agree to permit such sharing.”38 No further information is provided 
regarding the nature of such approval. For all we know, consent could be 
collected by asking for explicit in-app approval, or, conversely, by inserting a 
clause in extensive terms and conditions. 
Third, there is an anticompetitive risk regarding the Libra Association’s 
use of powers, particularly in its ability to select members and change the 
protocol or network.39 Denying or withdrawing memberships may consti-
tute an anticompetitive practice where the decision is not objectively justi-
fied and where membership is essential for operating on the market.40 
 
 35. In the United States, see Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004), and in Europe, see Case C-241/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann 
v. Commission of the European Communities (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-00743. For more, see 
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Indispensability and Abuse of Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to 
Slovak Telekom and Google Shopping, 10 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 532 (2019). 
 36. See, for instance, Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 6, 2019, B6-22/16. 
Similarly, see Frank Bajak, Top Antitrust Enforcer Warns Big Tech over Data Collection, AP 
(Nov. 8, 2019) https://apnews.com/a31ee585d23143769823791942e736ab [https://perma
.cc/Y2QK-ELV9?type=image] (quoting Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, saying, 
“although privacy fits primarily within the realm of consumer protection law, it would be a 
grave mistake to believe that privacy concerns can never play a role in antitrust analysis”). 
 37. On the subject of causation, see Thibault Schrepel, Repeal Continental Can, 
CONCURRENTIALISTE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://leconcurrentialiste.com/2019/12/20/repeal-
continental-can/ [https://perma.cc/8WPQ-2UFX]. 
 38. Examining Facebook’s Proposed Digital Currency and Data Privacy Considerations: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. 6 (2019) (testi-
mony of David Marcus, Head of Calibra, Facebook) (emphasis added), https://www.banking
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Marcus%20Testimony%207-16-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE56-
KCZD]. 
 39. LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 6 (“The Libra Association will oversee the evo-
lution of the Libra Blockchain protocol and network . . . .”). 
 40. On sanctioning associations denying membership, see in the United States North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295–98 (1985), 
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Moreover, the Libra Association’s ability to manage the “network” indicates 
a power that goes beyond the mere framework of managing its memberships 
and extends to any holder of the cryptocurrency.41 This power stems from 
Libra’s permissioned nature, which gives blockchain gatekeepers the ability 
to prevent others from reading the blockchain, proposing new transactions, 
or validating blocks. Moreover, the authorization to perform any of these 
tasks may be overruled at any point, which could easily amount to an anti-
competitive practice.42 
As for modifying the protocol and rules of Libra’s blockchain, one might 
want to scrutinize whether any anticompetitive practices—such as predatory 
pricing, refusal to grant access, tying, or predatory innovation—will be im-
plemented concomitantly.43 Again, the power required to impose such modi-
fications is only seen in permissioned blockchains,44 which explains why 
they are more conducive to anticompetitive practices than permissionless 
blockchains. 
The fourth and final risk relates to the fact that Calibra will charge fees 
for the use of Libra.45 Similar issues to those in the Amex case will arise, par-
ticularly depending on who bears the costs and how much the costs are.46 
CONCLUSION 
The Libra project raises numerous antitrust law issues, which is not par-
ticularly unusual considering the project’s wingspan. Four features related to 
the very nature of this project should nonetheless be considered. 
First, the implementation of anticompetitive practices would affect sev-
eral billion users.47 The stakes are considerable, as they are for any company 
whose product or service is used throughout the world. 
 
and in Europe, see Case T-461/07, Visa Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 2011 E.C.R. II-01729, 
¶¶ 21–25. 
 41. See Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact on Consumers, 
Investors, and the American Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
116th Cong. (2019) (written statement of proposed testimony by Katharina Pistor, Edwin B. 
Parker Professor of Comparative Law and Director, Center on Global Legal Transformation, 
Columbia Law School), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba00-
wstate-pistork-20190717.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRK8-HLWM]. 
 42. Schrepel, supra note 3, at 310. 
 43. See id. at 308 (listing potential exclusionary practices and evaluating the likelihood 
that each will occur on public versus private blockchains). 
 44. See generally Schrepel, supra note 6, at 34 (analyzing the “blockchain power game” 
by which a participant may wield “sufficient influence to be qualified as control under antitrust 
or competition law”). 
 45. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 31 (“Will Calibra charge fees? Transaction 
fees will be low-cost and transparent, especially if you’re sending money internationally. Cali-
bra will cut fees to help people keep more of their money.”). 
 46. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 47. As Calibra points out: 
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Second, some of these anticompetitive practices would become unstop-
pable if they are implemented on a blockchain.48 Although Libra is permis-
sioned, which calls into question its immutability,49 the Association will lose 
all revocation power on a number of practices as it will need a majority of its 
nodes to agree on changing the consensus process. The larger the Associa-
tion becomes, the more difficult it will be to stop anticompetitive practices 
associated with the consensus. 
Third, even after considering the aforementioned concerns, it remains 
surprising that the European Commission sent a questionnaire to Libra be-
fore Libra’s actual launch. The role of antitrust agencies is to correct market 
failures.50 By definition, such failures do not exist here yet—Libra is still just 
a project. As such, the European Commission’s questionnaire to investigate 
“potential anti-competitive behaviors” seems to confirm that political elites 
fear the growing power technology giants wield. Not all projects in the pipe-
line are subject to antitrust law-related interrogations. 
Finally, the cryptocurrency landscape in which Libra is introduced can-
not be forgotten. The Libra Association intends—even if it denies as much—
to compete with state currencies and the existing financial system. By send-
ing out a questionnaire at such an early stage of development, the European 
Commission is sending a strong signal regarding its willingness to open in-
vestigations the day Libra launches. Similar signals have been sent by the 
United States.51 These moves raise concerns as to whether such an adversari-
al approach adopted by national antitrust authorities will ultimately discour-
age the introduction of new competition in the cryptocurrency space52 and, 
consequently, result in the preservation of current regulatory, political, and 
 
As well as being a standalone app available on iOS and Android, Calibra will integrate the Cal-
ibra wallet into Facebook platforms like WhatsApp and Messenger. This means Facebook’s 2.7 
billion users will be able to access Calibra’s functionality through apps they already use. Offer-
ing this integrated service alongside the Calibra standalone app helps make financial services 
more accessible to more people. 
See About Calibra, CALIBRA, https://www.calibra.com/about [https://perma.cc/F2FZ-3QZL]. 
 48. As Mark Zuckerberg underlined, recourse against blockchain is much harder than 
against tech giants. See Harvard Law Sch., Zittrain and Zuckerberg Discuss Encryption, ‘Infor-
mation Fiduciaries’ and Targeted Advertisements, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGchhsKhG-A. 
 49. See Schrepel, supra note 26, at 162. 
 50. Thibault Schrepel, Antitrust Without Romance, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (forthcom-
ing 2020). 
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financial power structures.53 More generally, such early skepticism by inter-
national antitrust agencies calls into question the agencies’ ability to inter-
vene impartially; after all, Libra would compete with the state’s own curren-
currency, thus influencing the antitrust agencies’ motivation to get involved. 
As cryptocurrencies rise in popularity and continue to develop, these 
regulatory concerns will continue to brim on a global scale. The regulatory 
agencies investigating new cryptocurrencies like Libra have mixed 
incentives, potentially counseling for a diffusion of these agencies’ power in 
this context. One may therefore contend that decisions regarding the viabil-
ity of cryptocurrency services are best taken elsewhere.54 
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